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Abstract 
The Education Ministry in the Australian State of Victoria undertook a major project: 
building the Ultranet, between 2005 and its release in August 2010. The possibilities offered 
by the Ultranet were considerable, but up take by schools was not. The Ultranet is not yet 
dead, but it is certainly not in a good state of health. An analysis of communications shows 
that user needs were not assessed adequately, and that the poor handling of the system-wide 
launch was sufficient to disenchant even those who had expressed initial support. This e-
Government project is studied as an example of project failure, particularly in regard to its 
human aspects. The existence of small pockets of dedicated users points to the possibility of 
resurrection of those parts of the business case where the users continue to value the feature. 
Suggestions are made for a possible means of project recovery that would address the 
problems in this case, and a framework is proposed for anticipating other e-Government 
project failure points. 
Keywords: Ultranet, eGovernment, project management, systems implementation, technology 
adoption 
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In 2006 the Victorian Government made an election commitment to provide parents of school 
children virtual access to their child‟s classroom 24 hours a day using a new portal: „the 
Ultranet‟.  
―The Ultranet is a new online system that will take Victorian government 
schools and students into the learning environment of the future. It is a state-
wide, secure site that students, parents and teachers can access via the internet 
to use online learning activities. From the end of September, parents will be able 
to view their child‘s attendance to help keep up-to-date with their child‘s 
progress. This information will build up over time to include their homework 
and in-class learning activities, creating an ongoing record for each student. 
These records will travel with your child from year to year and school to school. 
The Ultranet provides the opportunity for parents to gain a better understanding 
of their child‘s learning progress. It aims to encourage open communication 
about what‘s happening at school.‖  (DEECD 2010d) 
Prior to this, in 2005 the Department of Education commenced a joint R&D initiative with the 
Oracle Corporation to produce “the prototype for a student centric system that supports 
teaching and learning, curriculum delivery and the management of knowledge in Victorian 
schools‖ (DEECD 2005). The Department of Education then conducted a pilot project for the 
Ultranet in 22 schools over 18 months (Griffin and Woods 2006). This was reported as a 
“proof of concept student-centric ICT system, called Students@Centre, to support online 
teaching and learning, curriculum delivery and knowledge management in Victorian 
government schools.” (DEECD 2010c). 
In 2007 the Department of Education and Early Childhood Development (DEECD) attempted 
to develop a business case for the Ultranet. Its first attempt was rejected by government. The 
second business case submitted later that year was a revised version of the first and proposed 
the Ultranet as an intuitive, student-centred electronic learning environment that supports high 
quality learning and teaching. Its objectives were to: 
• “improve responsiveness to individual learning needs 
• provide better information to parents, the school system and government 
• improve the efficiency of the learning environment and school administration 
• adopt an enterprise approach to intranet development 
• exploit previous ICT investments.” (VAGO 2012 :4) 
The business case acknowledged that schools already had the choice of a number of 
commercial ICT solutions and that many schools were already using these. It emphasised, 
however, “that no single solution could provide the full level of scalability, security, 
interoperability and functionality that is needed to meet the identified business needs and 
objectives of the Ultranet” (VAGO 2012 :4). In August 2007 DEECD put out a request-for-
tender (RFT) to develop and manage the Ultranet, but several months of evaluation and 
negotiation were unsuccessful, as no tenderers could meet the original $65 million budget. 
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Figure 1: Ultranet Key Performance Indicators from DEECD 2007 Ultranet Business Case 
(VAGO 2012 :5) 
As a result, in September 2008 DEECD reduced the scope of the project to a level it believed 
could be achieved within the original budget. In November 2008 it issued a second RFT with 
a requirement that the project be complete by September 2010. This time a preferred vendor, 
the Australian IT firm CSG Limited, was selected. A third variation on the business case was 
presented to government in May 2009 dropping the need for the Ultranet to provide 
administrative support to schools. 
The Ultranet, which is essentially an extended intranet/extranet was rolled out to all 
Government schools on time in September 2010 (Tatnall and Dakich 2011) when the then 
Victorian Minister for Education noted that: “The Victorian Government is committed to 
giving every child every opportunity to experience the full potential of online learning, 
collaboration and information sharing” and described the Ultranet as the “Victorian 
Government‘s biggest investments in information and communication technology in our 
public education system” (Pike 2010). 
With great promise (Tatnall, Dakich and Davey 2011), adoption of the Ultranet by schools 
and teachers has been disappointing. In a November 2011 report, the Victorian Ombudsman 
noted that: “Despite its early problems, Ultranet has been delivered and is working in schools 
and there is widespread support for the concept.” (Victorian Ombudsman 2011 :96). By the 
following year however, in December 2012 an Auditor-General‟s report indicated that: “Use 
of the Ultranet is low, and declining” (VAGO 2012 :ix). The report went on to add that:  
“The Ultranet project was poorly planned and implemented. None of its three 
business cases had a well thought out needs analysis or gave considered options 
to deliver the project. The various business cases did not answer the ‗Why 
invest?‘ question for the Ultranet, nor did they provide a sound basis for the 
project‘s approval.” (VAGO 2012 :ix). 
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The Ultranet could now be considered to be a failed project, but one that can perhaps be 
saved. This paper discusses the Ultranet project, how the project failed and how it might be 
saved. 
2 Background: the Victorian Education Ultranet 
The Ultranet was designed as a Web-based online system to support delivery of curriculum, 
online teaching and learning and sharing of knowledge across all Victorian Government 
schools. It began its service to all Victorian Government schools in September 2010 as “a 
student centred electronic learning environment that supports high quality learning and 
teaching, connects students, teachers and parents and enables efficient knowledge transfer.” 
(DEECD 2011; Tatnall, Dakich et al. 2011).  
Speaking of the Ultranet in a 2005 addition of „The Education News‟ the Deputy Secretary of 
the Office of School Education acknowledges that: "Many schools are experimenting with 
their own [ICT] frameworks and have done some very impressive work in utilising technology 
to inform learning, however, this project aims to build a product that provides an ICT 
framework that allows the whole school community to engage with learning in ways not 
previously possible." (Fraser 2005). 
The Ultranet has many of the features found in a business extranet in that it is closed to people 
outside the Victorian Government school community and requires a username and password 
to gain access. Its intended users are school teachers, as well as school students and their 
parents, all of whom would be issued with user names and passwords. The Ultranet divides its 
sub-websites into „Spaces‟, where each Space provides one of the following different levels of 
access:  
1. Private Spaces accessible only by the owner. 
2. Shared Spaces that can be seen with permission. 
3. Public Spaces that can be seen by anyone. 
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Figure 2: Information for parents – Who can see student information in the Ultranet?  
(DEECD 2010a) 
One important difference to most business extranets however is its size, with over 500,000 
users (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2010; DEECD 2010b). The Ultranet has many of the 
features found in learning management systems like Blackboard or Moodle, but it differs in 
having features intended to inform parents about their child‟s education and about the school 
they attend. Specifically, the Ultranet was designed to achieve the following:  
1. To allow students to access personalised learning activities and to keep an on-going 
record of these activities. This would later enable every child to have a complete 
record of achievement across all years of schooling. 
2. To provide students with their own online workspaces and personally tailored 
education programs. 
3. To enable students in remote schools to access specialised curriculum and podcast 
classes from schools that excel in various subject areas.  
4. To allow teachers to create curriculum plans, collaborate with other teachers, monitor 
student progress and provide student assessment. 
5. To reduce the administrative burden on teachers by using it to record attendance, and 
to assist with creating school reports and timetabling. 
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6. To enable parents to see information about their child‟s learning. This would include 
attendance records, timetables, test results, learning progress, homework activities and 
teacher feedback, and be available to them at any time. 
(DEECD 2011; Tatnall and Dakich 2011; Tatnall, Michael and Dakich 2011) 
3 Great Educational Opportunities, but a Failure to Enthuse 
Schools and Teachers 
Although it has not been widely adopted around the state (VAGO 2012), the Ultranet is now 
well used by a select group of schools, mainly centred around several specific regions, both as 
a tool for student collaboration and as a means of communicating with parents. In one 
particular country school parents are given fortnightly update reports on their child‟s school 
progress through use of the Ultranet (Topsfield 2012b). In another example a group of schools 
in Melbourne‟s west held a „Big Day Away‟ each week in 2011 in which children were 
bussed to a school centre “to participate in Ultranet sessions based on the interests and 
knowledge of the students” (Pizer 2012). 
Around the rest of the State there is little use of the system with only 10% of students and 
27% of teachers regularly logging in. This is partially due to a ban by the Teachers Union in 
an enterprise bargaining dispute (Australian Education Union - Victoria 2012), but this alone 
does not explain why such little use is being made of the Ultranet. This has more to do with 
lack of understanding of the Ultranet‟s potential uses and disenchantment with the value of 
the system compared with other tools that are more easily adaptable and usable. 
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Figure 3: What is the Ultranet? (DEECD 2011) 
A 2010 survey reported by the Victorian Ombudsman (2011) indicated that 65% of School 
Principals thought that the Ultranet could have positive effects on student learning. They 
thought that the Ultranet could enhance teaching practices, support school culture and 
improve the school‟s ability to communicate with parents. When asked whether they 
considered the implementation of the Ultranet at their school to have been successful 
however, only 37% said that it had. Another indication of the stagnation of the Ultranet is the 
lack of apparent interest in Ministry of Education sources, especially after a change of State 
Government. Entry to the schools page for parents makes no mention of the Ultranet (DEECD 
2012).  
4 Research Methodology 
This study used thematic document analysis to determine themes within documents relating to 
the system. The search terms „Ultranet‟, „Ultranet coach‟ and „Lead Teacher‟ were used in 
several search engines to generate an initial set of documents and links. Links were followed 
where relevant to generate a further set of documents. These documents included Education 
Ministry and Department of Education and Early Childhood Development formal documents 
as well as documents from most schools in Victoria. The formal documents also included 
several Governmental reports including analysis of the Ultranet. These reports were generated 
by intensive study by the offices of the Ombudsman and the Auditor-Generals Department. 
The search also produced a large body of informal web based information. The web based 
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information included pages and blogs meant to support teachers together with a very large 
body of commentary by individuals and organisations.  
These documents were analysed using thematic document analysis (Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane 2006; Bowen 2009; Morris and Ecclesfield 2011) in which several researchers seek 
underlying themes of meaning within the text independently. This is achieved through an 
iterative process of „skimming‟ the material, reading thoroughly and then interpreting the 
meaning of text in context. This iterative process allows a type of pattern recognition within 
the material and each researcher identifies a set of themes integrating the data from the 
various sources. A final set of themes is generated from the overlapping outcomes. This 
method has been used in similar intensive case studies and is particularly appropriate to this 
case: 
―As a research method, document analysis is particularly applicable to 
qualitative case studies—intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a 
single phenomenon, event, organisation, or program‖ (Bowen 2009) 
In this case the document analysis was used to gain insight into what happened but also into 
the conceptions of those people involved in the introduction of the system. We are not so 
interested in the facts of the case, although these are apparent from the detailed formal 
investigations carried out, but in the evolving expressed attitudes of the stakeholders in the 
new system. A case study in system failure can be approached from many viewpoints. An 
aspect of this case is that a working system was produced that satisfied most definitions of 
system success. The system, however, is not being used. This means that the case is best 
considered as a project rather than the more common information-systems-lens of systems 
development. 
5 Project Management Methodologies and Project Failures 
Information systems failure is seen by the literature to be anything from slight cost or time 
overruns to total abandonment. This can include situations such as when the project: 
 Does not deliver the benefits the customer expected 
 Investment costs exceed the benefits of doing the project 
 Does not meet all the client‟s or stakeholder requirements 
 Does not meet all design specifications or quality standards 
 Over-runs its project or does not meet its scheduled project finish date 
 Has some aspect of its project technology not operating properly 
 Is not fully used  
 Collapses completely. 
 
The much discredited „Chaos Report‟ by the Standish group in 1995 (Standish Group 1995) 
has subsequently been shown merely to have overestimated the proportion of information 
systems that fail. More recent work shows that information systems continue to fail 
(Liebowitz 1999; Dalcher and Drevin 2003; Shoniregun 2004; Jørgensen and Moløkken-
Østvold 2006; El Emam and Koru 2008) and that this is very largely due to the problems of 
anticipating how humans will interact with information systems (Mitev 2000; Eisenmann 
2002; Tsumaki and Tamai 2006; Bali and Wickramasinghe 2010).  
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Project failure often has much to do with lack of accountability and responsibility, lack of 
adequate scope definition or lack of communication between those involved. The failure of 
systems is a good lesson to system designers but is too late for the system concerned. It is of 
much more value to understand the process of failure and to identify the points of intervention 
that might enable the avoidance of failure. Obviously the most important facet of impending 
failure to study is that of the humans for whom the system was designed.  
There are a number of accepted approaches to project management, the Project Management 
Body of Knowledge (PMBoK) and PRINCE2 being two of the most important. The Project 
Management Institute‟s PMBoK (Project Management Institute 2013) divides project 
management into nine aspects and then describes what work needs to be done in each: project 
integration, project scope, project time, project cost, project quality, project human resources, 
project communications, project risk and project procurement. 
The PRINCE2 (PRojects IN Controlled Environments 2) process-based approach to project 
management (APM Group Ltd 2012) was developed by the UK government for use in its 
public projects. PRINCE2 is based on seven principles (business justification, learn from 
experience, defined roles and responsibilities, manage by stages, manage by exception, focus 
on products and tailor to suit the environment), seven themes (business case, organisation, 
plans, progress, risks, quality, change) and seven processes (Starting up a project, Initiating a 
project, Directing a project, Controlling a stage, Managing stage boundaries, Managing 
product delivery and Closing a project) 
The Ombudsman‟s Report notes that management of the Ultranet project was not as good as it 
could have been and that lack of a consistent and well thought out approach to project 
management caused problems. Neither PMBok nor PRINCE2 methodologies were used in the 
Ultranet project. 
―Many resources exist that can assist agencies to manage ICT-enabled projects well, 
including the Auditor-General‘s guide, Investing Smarter in Public Sector ICT: Turning 
Principles into Practice. However, the public sector‘s lack of competence in ICT 
contributed to its inability to manage ICT-enabled projects and to project failures. It also 
led to a dependency on expensive, contracted staff who often do not share public sector 
values. More work is required to attract skilled ICT staff to government.‖ (Victorian 
Ombudsman 2011 :9) 
6 Document themes 
The large body of documents were analysed by the team in order to identify user perspectives 
of the project.  
6.1 Delivery – a first failure of trust 
The Ultranet was released to much fanfare on 9
th
 August 2010 when all Victoria‟s 1,600 State 
Schools were closed for an extraordinary student-free professional development day to allow 
teachers to familiarise themselves with the new technology (DEECD 2010d). All Government 
Schools Principals and Assistant Principals were called to Melbourne attend Ultranet‟s „Big 
Day Out‟ at the Melbourne Exhibition and Convention Centre. Teachers across the state were 
asked to participate from their school locations. Unfortunately this day turned out to be 
disastrous when the system crashed at 9am. Many of the state's 42,000 teachers and principals 
experienced problems when they attempted to log on, and later, when the system was running, 
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those who could gain access reported that it was running extremely slowly (Holden 2010; 
Levy 2010; Topsfield 2010).  
One important definition of project failure is the failure to deliver, and this spectacular initial 
failure had, as an immediate corollary, a loss of faith by teachers in the system. It also resulted 
in a review of the proposed benefits of the scheme. Emails from the Ultranet General 
Manager immediately before the launch day show that significant downtime was then being 
experienced and suggest the day should have been rethought (Peck 2010). Teachers were 
frustrated on the day and their attention was drawn to simple issues such as usability and the 
lack of problematisation of the Ultranet as an innovation. Following the disastrous 
introduction day the Ultranet was made more stable and began to deliver. 
6.2 Problematisation – a failure to establish need 
There was, however, another problem with adoption. A typical blog from the time of the 
training day disaster (Fraudster 2010) showed that teachers were already using a number of 
different tools that were more easily adaptable and usable for many of the purposes provided 
by the Ultranet. This raised the question: why should I adopt and use the Ultranet? To assist 
with implementation, Ultranet coaches were appointed in each Education Ministry region. 
These coaches were teachers based at a school and with a small group of schools to service. 
Their positions were at a significant salary increase for most of the appointees.  As well as 
coaches each school had an Ultranet Champion appointed called a Lead User. These support 
structures are well researched and had been used to good effect with previous educational 
innovations. Efforts to convince schools and teachers to made good use of the Ultranet was a 
critical factor in its adoption and the Ombudsman‟s Report notes that: 
―Users‘ resistance and reluctance to change are the biggest potential barriers to 
Ultranet and uptake and ongoing usage will have to be monitored carefully. 
Ultimately, Ultranet‘s success will be dependent on whether students, teachers 
and parents are able to access and use the system and whether they feel that it is 
having a positive impact on teaching and learning. It is therefore important that 
DEECD develop a detailed strategy and plans to further develop Ultranet so that 
it does not become stale and dated.‖  (Victorian Ombudsman 2011 :97) 
6.3 Upper management support – a failure of faith 
A further nail in the Ultranet‟s coffin was a change of State Government in December 2010. 
As the Ultranet was a project of the former State Government, the new government, while not 
attempting to kill the project, was less than keen to see it succeed. Within a very short time 
the Ultranet coaches were advised they would no longer be employed and that their positions 
would be withdrawn at the end of 2011. After this time, little extra effort was made by 
DEECD to improve the Ultranet or to sell its benefits to the education community. One 
Primary School Principal when asked whether the change of State Government had made a 
difference to adoption of the Ultranet said: “Yes, all the difference”. 
Apart from problems with user acceptance, the Ultranet project appears to have been flawed 
from the beginning. In November 2011 the Victorian State Ombudsman reported on a number 
of Government “ICT-Enabled Projects” that had not gone as well as they should. The report 
noted that: 
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―The Ultranet project suffered from inadequate upfront planning and a general 
disregard for industry and Gateway advice, which indicated the project could not 
be delivered within the budget and timelines. Ignoring this advice resulted in a 
failed tender that cost around $5 million. It also set the project back by a year and 
damaged the reputation of Ultranet.‖ (Victorian Ombudsman 2011 :25) 
A year later, the 2012 Auditor-General‟s Report on the Ultranet was quite scathing indicating 
that: 
―The Ultranet project was poorly planned and implemented. None of its three 
business cases had a well thought out needs analysis or gave considered options 
to deliver the project. The various business cases did not answer the ‗Why 
invest?‘ question for the Ultranet, nor did they provide a sound basis for the 
project‘s approval.‖ (VAGO 2012 :ix) 
The Auditor-General further reported that: 
 “The Ultranet has not delivered its main objectives or expected benefits. 
 There were a number of serious process issues and apparent probity breaches in 
relation to the Ultranet procurement. 
 No cost-benefit analysis has been conducted to determine whether the Ultranet 
provides value for money, or whether the same functionalities could have been 
delivered more cost effectively.  
 Use of the Ultranet is low, and declining. 
 Poor quality financial data means that actual capital and operating expenditure for the 
Ultranet is unclear.” (VAGO 2012 :19) 
 
Given that $5 million was spent on the failed 2007 tender, the original $64.6 million budget 
for the Ultranet should now be seen as $69.6 million. In addition, this cost estimate did not 
include DEECD‟s costs of another $5 million as systems integrator making the total cost 
$74.4 million. The Ombudsman‟s report (2011) also adds that training costs had not been 
fully calculated and recorded against the project. The Auditor-General (2012) notes that the 
full costs of the project were thus poorly recorded by DEECD and that a conservative 
estimate of actual costs by June 2013 would be $180 million, or about three times the original 
budget. 
The Auditor-General (2012) notes that in addition to cost overruns the project scope was also 
considerably reduced with its business requirements reduced by 90% from the 1,260 functions 
stated in the 2007 business case to 131 functions contained in the 2008 RFT specifications. 
The concurrent user requirement was also reduced from 250,000 users to 78,000 and the 
Ultranet‟s total storage from 330TB to 160TB.  
―Some six years since its announcement as a government priority, the Ultranet 
has not delivered any of the main objectives that were expected when the project 
was funded. The Ultranet is significantly late and over budget – and with limited 
functionality – when compared with what was originally announced.‖ (VAGO 
2012 :20) 
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Figure 4: Assessment of the Ultranet‟s expected benefits (VAGO 2012 :29) 
The Ultranet‟s low usage rate along with uncertainty on DEECD‟s view on whether schools 
can opt out of the system is, according to the Auditor-General (2012), challenges its viability. 
This is then having a negative effect on delivery of expected benefits from the Ultranet and 
meaning that “the government‘s key learning technology investment is now under serious 
threat‖. It also means that the return on investment of substantial public funds is dubious. 
6.4 Stakeholder analysis – failure to understand 
There are also alternatives to the Ultranet as a blog by a secondary school teacher explains: 
―Google Apps for Education gives teachers and students at my school everything we could 
ask for in an online environment: flexibility, ease of use, customisability, practicality, 
efficiency, effectiveness, collaboration, availability on multiple devices etc…for FREE!‖ 
(ReflectiveTeacher 2012) 
Another problem with Ultranet implementation was that DEECD did not give sufficient 
consideration to what effect introducing the Ultranet would have on teacher workloads as they 
learned to use it and to integrate it into their teaching practice. The Auditor-General‟s Report 
(2012) notes that even after the initial stage of coming to grips with the Ultranet, teachers 
would need to spend extra time for professional development. They would also need to spend 
time assisting and training parents to use the Ultranet. This does not appear to have been 
considered. 
7 Can the Ultranet be Saved? 
The fact that the Ultranet is well used by some schools suggests it can be saved, but this is not 
all clear at the moment. On a positive note one blogger indicates that: “Overall, I am 
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disappointed with the Government‘s spending on this project and the poor usability thus far, 
but I do like the idea of it and the potential that it holds.” (ReflectiveTeacher 2012). The 
Ombudsman reports that: 
“Users‘ resistance and reluctance to change are the biggest potential barriers to 
Ultranet and uptake and ongoing usage will have to be monitored carefully. 
Ultimately, Ultranet‘s success will be dependent on whether students, teachers 
and parents are able to access and use the system and whether they feel that it is 
having a positive impact on teaching and learning. It is therefore important that 
DEECD develop a detailed strategy and plans to further develop Ultranet so that 
it does not become stale and dated.‖  (Victorian Ombudsman 2011 :97) 
Assuming that any further technical problems can be addressed; will the Ultranet be adopted 
by teachers, students and parents? A new information system is of no use unless it is adopted 
and used, and as with any technological innovation, people will only adopt a new technology 
if they see some value in it; if they see that it will assist them in some way (Tatnall 2011). As 
the old English proverb says: “You can lead a horse to water but you cannot make it drink‖.  
In its recommendations, the Victorian Auditor-General‟s Report (2012) concludes that it will 
be important to identify and address the underlying causes of low take-up rates across the 
school system by teachers, students and parents. A new Information System will only be 
adopted if potential users make a decision to do so. Clearly it is necessary for DEECD to do 
more work to convince teachers of the value of the Ultranet and encourage adoption. One way 
that this could be achieved is through a series of well thought out professional development 
activities. Another possibility is the setting up of “Lighthouse Schools” well equipped with 
ICT and with teachers well versed in its possibilities to demonstrate a variety of uses that 
could be made of the Ultranet. The Australian Government provided funds for an approach 
like this in the 1980s when computers were just beginning to be introduced in schools and its 
computer education program was in full swing. The Auditor-General‟s Report also 
recommends that DEECD “expedite the provision of guidance to schools on the current status 
of the Ultranet as the department‘s key learning technology investment, and clarify the policy 
context of schools‘ autonomy in purchasing non-Ultranet learning technologies” (VAGO 
2012 :31). 
In December 2012 The Age newspaper (Topsfield 2012c) reported that the Victorian 
Government would seek advice on whether the Ultranet, now noted to have cost $180 million, 
could be salvaged. In another article the secretary of the Department of Education and Early 
Childhood Development was quoted as announcing that the government was "looking at the 
Ultranet in its entirety... It's a fact, and a well-known fact I think, that the level of take-up of 
the Ultranet has been nothing like what was intended." (Topsfield 2012a). The Ultranet faces 
a future that is far from a secure one!  
Given the large investments by governments in various large scale technology solutions for 
various sectors including education, healthcare and disability, we wonder if there are lessons 
from the Ultranet  experience that can be useful in future studies of a similar nature which 
will thereby serve to save significant costs and heartache. 
8 Conclusion 
This paper is a careful analysis of a case study of eGovernment with very specific 
characteristics: a working system was produced but is not being used. The decision was taken 
to study documents relating to this case as an Information Systems Project, using Project 
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Management principles as the focus. The analysis identified stakeholder attitudes to the 
project. Identification of these attitudes should then enable a sensible approach to be taken 
regarding the possible revival of the system. The approach of considering the system from a 
project management view seems to be especially relevant to the nature of this systems 
development. 
The documents revealed a number of themes and points of failure. Each of these seems 
possibly to be a more generally applicable failure point for eGovernment systems. The 
recommendations made here are without formal foundation and merely seem sensible to the 
author team from their experience. 
Delivery – a first failure of trust. The „grand opening‟ of the Ultranet was a technical failure. 
Recognising that this destroyed the trust of users in the system should point the way for the 
system owners to create trust-building exercises. We recommend that specific uses of the 
system be identified that would be of maximum value to teachers. When these are found to be 
robust there will be some return to trust in the system. 
Problematisation – a failure to establish need. The Ultranet was partially inspired by existing 
systems in which teachers had found value. As even these systems, lacking integration and 
security, were not universally used, it seems teachers did not see a need for a monolithic 
system. While this could be seen as a project management failure that has passed, the failure 
to establish need can be overcome. In circumstances of this type it seems sensible to identify 
the aspects of the original business case of most utility to teachers and ensure these are 
incorporated. The Ministry has identified communication with parents and insisted that all 
reports be generated by the system. This seems likely to provide efficiency gains that directly 
impact on teacher workloads and hence to restore some case for a need for the system. 
Upper management support – a failure of faith. In democratic societies all eGovernment 
systems are subject to the problems that arise from change of government. It is natural for 
ruling parties to want to associate significant infrastructure projects with the party rather than 
the State. Information Systems developers in the government sector should be aware of this 
fact when undertaking project planning.  
Stakeholder analysis. Effective systems must be of value to the people who use them beyond 
the cost of their use. There seems to be an attitude of „sunk costs‟ when considering teachers 
in schools. A presumption that teacher time is infinitely flexible and additional tasks can be 
added to their role at no additional cost.  
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